

# Integrated Diagnostics Lessons Learned F-15 APG-63(v)1 Program

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# Overview

## F-15 APG-63(v)1 RADAR

- History
  - Requirements
  - Implementation
- USAF Evaluation
  - Metrics
  - Performance
- Lessons Learned



**We no Longer have CNDs.  
We have faults that some  
are harder to find than  
others.**

**Mel Carpenter**  
**RADAR Lead Engineer**

**APG-63(V)1**  
**Radar Langley AFB Briefing**  
**June 2000**




# Historical Information

# SUPPORT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

- SUPPORT SYSTEM ENHANCEMENTS
  - 120 HOUR MTBMA (LRU MINIMUM OF 500 HOURS MTBD)
    - Reduced Unnecessary Maintenance Actions
    - System is capable of distinguishing between faults and normal operations
    - Provide the Maintainer “POSITIVE ACTION”
  - Reduced “Can Not Duplicates”
    - Capture Parametric Data (Flight and System)
    - Identify “Bad Actors”
    - Testing Verticality
  - Provide Capability to Detect and Isolate 100% of all faults (ID Requirement)
    - Provide Supplemental Testing Procedures to cover BIT Test Voids
    - Identify Aircraft Wiring faults (Detection and Isolation Procedures)
  - Two Level Maintenance

# False Alarms

Only 8% of Failure Indications result in Corrective Action



Based on F15 APG-70 Repair data

# Form, Fit, Function Lifetime Contractor Support (FLICS)

- Implement F<sup>3</sup>I
- Guaranteed Availability Rate
- Support peace and war time scenarios
- USAF/Contractor forms partnership for sustainment over the system life cycle
- Affordable cost to USAF
- Must offer Government fall-back position

# Guarantee an Availability Rate

$$\text{Availability} = \frac{\text{MTBMA}}{\text{MTBMA} + \text{MDT}}$$

MTBMA is defined as:

- The average flying hours between maintenance actions

Where; Maintenance action defined as any effort required to correct a system malfunction

MDT is defined as the maintenance time required:

- Troubleshoot System
- Remove defective LRU
- • Obtain serviceable unit
- Install Replacement LRU
- Return the aircraft to operational status



# Availability Guarantee

## Things Considered


- System Reliability
- Diagnostic Accuracy and Reliability
- Spares pipeline management and mobility planning
  - Insure proper number of spares at each base, optimize turn around time (TAT), work as IPT to insure aircraft operational readiness
- Mitigate parts/technology availability in real time environment
  - Technology insertion when beneficial
- MTBMA maturation
  - Manage field failure root cause analysis, make MTBMA improvements
  - Adjust diagnostic scheme based on hardware effects and associated aging effects

# Availability Guarantee

## Things Considered


- Proper Maintainer / Pilot Training and Technical Data
  - Tech Pubs updated during EMD
  - CFR/CFI system update; deployment during OT&E
  - All technical information evaluated vs “as designed”
  - Inclusive Diagnostic System at all levels of assembly
  - Single Maintenance Database Source (Wireless LAN Network)
- Automated configuration management required
  - For tracking:  
Base ↔ Aircraft ↔ LRU ↔ SRU ↔ Critical Component
  - Manage parts inventory
  - Tracking of bad actor hardware, remove when necessary

# Support System Implementation



# Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS)

- All failures beyond LRU ESS receive ...




# Performance Evaluation OT&E

AFOTEC



# MTBMA Requirement

APG-63(V)1 MTBMA



# Diagnostics Performance

## OT&E Testing

- Diagnostic System properly diagnosed all 16 failures
  - Built In Test detected 14 failures
  - Supplemental Diagnostics isolated 2 failures
- Number of Can Not Duplicates (BCS) = 1

## MTBF and MTBMA Earned Value

- AFOTEC MTBMA =  $\frac{206.9 \text{ Flight hours}}{16 \text{ Maintenance Events}} = 12.9 \text{ hours}$
- “Earned Value” assessment applies verifiable corrective actions (In the “now” condition, the event would have been prevented)
  - **Root Cause and Preventative action taken on 10 Maintenance Events**
  - **Earned Value MTBMA =  $\frac{206.9 \text{ Flight hours}}{6 \text{ Maintenance Events}} = 34.8 \text{ hours}$**
- $MTBF_{dc}$  - based on three (3) true hardware failures =  $207/3 = 69.0 \text{ hours}$ 
  - The three components that failed have proven high reliability (pressure switch, 91K hours; switch filter, 143K hours; and tone modulator, 37K hours)
  - These failures during IOT&E are most likely random part failures



# What Happened?

- OEM Manufacturing & OEM Depot changed location
  - Remaining parts in parts bin used to build last units from El Segundo
  - Manufacturing learning curve (corporate knowledge / unique skills)
- Man in the Loop
  - Diagnostic Data capture not fully automated
    - Data captured 30% of the time
  - Evaluation site negated need for PMA at plane-side
- Training
  - Rotations resulted in Maintainers unfamiliar with RADAR & Support Concept
  - System used outside its designed capability
- Maintenance Data Collection System Infra-Structure woefully lacking
  - Not a staffed position
  - Lack of Hardware / Software configuration control
  - System capability varies from squadron to squadron

# Lessons Learned

- Automate the data collection process
  - Eliminate as much human interface as possible
  - Should be invisible to operator
- Maintenance Data at Depot is vital to effective repairs
  - Data collected needs to be detailed enough to duplicate failure at Depot
- Training
  - Provide Detailed Information on operating modes
    - Proper utilization / expectations
    - Identify normal operation under different environmental conditions
- Applying a new Support System to Legacy Aircraft meets resistance
  - Customer support from Top to Bottom is essential

Questions ???